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aBStract
In terms of migratory movements from the “Global South”, Turkey is a 
receiving, transit and sending country all at the same time. The paper analyzes 
these self-organized flows through the concept of the “autonomy of migration”. 
The paper starts off by outlining the defining impact of Turkish nationalist 
ideology on migratory movements. Next, the economy of transit migration 
that sustains contemporary flows is analyzed, given ever stricter border 
controls implemented as part of the Turkey’s process of EU acquis. Next 
labour emigration to European and the Middle Eastern countries is reviewed. 
Lastly, the differential access of migrants to informal employment in Turkey 
is examined in light of recent research findings. Gender, ethnicity and social 
networks are identified as factors that frame migrant agency. 
Keywords: Migration; Turkey; Informal economy.
reSumen
En términos de movimientos migratorios desde el “Sur Global”, Turquía es a 
un tiempo país receptor, de tránsito y emisor. Este trabajo analiza estos flujos 
auto-organizados a través del concepto de la “autonomía de la migración”. 
El trabajo comienza por delinear el impacto de la ideología nacionalista 
turca en los movimientos migratorios. A continuación, se estudia la economía 
de las migraciones de tránsito que sostiene los flujos contemporáneos, dados 
los controles en frontera, más estrictos que nunca, impuestos como parte del 
proceso de acceso de Turquía a la UE. Seguidamente, se estudia la emigración 
laboral a países europeos y de Oriente Medio. Finalmente, se examina el 
acceso diferencial de los migrantes al empleo informal en Turquía, a la luz de 
resultados de investigación recientes. Se identifican el género, la etnicidad y 
las redes sociales como factores que enmarcan las migraciones.
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1 . introduction1
The “autonomy of migration”, that is the self-organised transnational mobility, 
in which migrants take advantage of fissures in theoretically impermeable 
border regimes, is  increasingly being recognized as a key characteristic of 
current migration flows (Boutang 2002; Mezzadra 2005; Karakayalı/Tsianos 
2005). Inhabitants of the “Global South” devise and realize migration strategies 
to counter the economic and social disempowerment they experience through 
the hegemonic order of globality (Escobar 2004). Discussing the failure of 
European migration policies, Castles 2004 similarly concludes that „The formal 
power of governments and bureaucracies is being subverted by the human 
agency embodied in migration networks and transnational communities.“ 
(878).  
Turkey is a middle-income country with substantial levels of poverty and 
unemployment. Yet, considerable numbers of people from Asia and Africa 
transit Turkey undocumented on their way to Europe and migrants from 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries use tourist visas to engage in 
informal cross border trade and to seek employment opportunities in Turkey 
(Içduygu 2003). Do these stylized facts point to a “laissez passer, laissez faire” 
approach in Turkish migration policy? The paper analyzes the economic and 
political processes that sustain current transnational migratory flows from the 
“Global South” to and through Turkey. It makes the case that the permeability 
of Turkey’s borders and labour markets for irregular migrants are symptomatic 
of the “autonomy of migration” rather than of a liberal “laissez passer, laissez 
faire” approach.
The paper also contextualizes the analysis of current migration flows by 
drawing attention to similarities with and differences to historical pendants. 
Thus, Section 2 reminds us of the formative impact that nationalist ideology 
1  I would like to thank Bob Sutcliffe, Didem Danis¸  and two anonymous referees for many insightful 
comments. I would also like to thank Bilgin Ayata, Ildiko Beller-Hann, Bülent Küçük, Özlem Onaran, 
S¸emsa Özar and Ceren Özselçuk for their generosity in providing access to materials that were 
difficult to locate. The usual caveat applies.
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has had on migratory movements and humanitarian assistance. Section 3 
discusses the informal economy sustained through transit migration from the 
“Global South” to Western European countries. Section 4 examines patterns 
of labour emigration. Drawing on recent research findings, Section 5 analyzes 
migrants’ access to informal economic structures in trade and employment in 
Turkey. Section 6 draws some conclusions and points to directions for further 
research. 
2 . nationaliSt ideology and migratory flowS
2 .1 . the ottoman legacy
The decline of the Ottoman Empire generated migratory movements, which 
dramatically affected the ethnic composition of modern Turkey and thus had 
a formative effect on Turkish national identity. Earlier on, in 1857 a liberal 
Immigration Code had been introduced with the aim of attracting European 
settlers, albeit with little success (Akgündüz 1998). Nonetheless, various 
inflows of labour migration ensued in the course of the Empire’s incorporation 
into world markets (Keyder 1987). For example, European contract workers 
were hired to work at railway construction projects in Ottoman territories. 
Similarly, the development of agriculture as an export industry spurred labour 
migration from Greece and the Black Sea region to Western Anatolia. The 
extent of clandestine labour migration at the time can only be guessed: 
“… on 11 June 1909 several hundred Muslim workers crossed the border 
to Greece illegally (without passports) with the intention of working only 20 
days in Thessaly and then coming back again.”2
Yet, it is the forced displacement of Ottoman subjects rather than labour 
migration that accounts for the vast share of migratory movements in the late 
Ottoman period. The political turmoil accompanying the disintegration of 
the Ottoman Empire led to massive expulsions based on ethnic and religious 
affiliations. Between the mid 19th century and the early 1920s, close to four 
million Turks, Tatars and Circassians were forced to migrate from the Caucasus 
and Crimean regions to the Ottoman heartland (Akgündüz 1998: 98-99). 
Large parts of the local Turkish and/or Muslim populations from the Balkans 
were also resettled during the course of nation building across Southern 
Europe in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. During the early 1920s, over one 
million Anatolian Greeks fled the war between the Turkish and Greek armies 
in Western Anatolia. The displacement was further consolidated through the 
1923 compulsory population exchange agreed between Greece and Turkey, 
which also affected a part of the Turkish communities in Greece (around 
350,000 people) (Hirschon 2003)3. The exchange constituted one of the first 
2 Akgündüz 1998, p.107.
3 See also “Passing Drama”, a documentary film by Angela Melitopoulos 2002.
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treaties in which the international diplomatic community endorsed ‘unmixing 
peoples’ for reasons of security and political stability (Barutciski 2003). 
The most tragic incidence of forced migration remains the deportation 
and murder of more than one million Armenian Ottoman subjects from 1915 
onwards (Birikim 2005; Akçam 2004; Cohen 1997: 42-55). The pogroms 
of 1894-1895 and of 1909, during which over 300,000 Armenians were 
killed can be read as a precursor to later developments (Insel 2005) – just 
as the mass emigration of Armenian and Syrian Christian Ottoman subjects 
to the Americas, involving around 800,000 people between 1860 and 1914 
(Akgündüz 1998). But the 1915 order of deportation to Syria and Palestine 
was unique in the sense that it was a planned and systematically implemented 
strategy of ethnic cleansing, reflecting the desire of the nascent Turkish 
nationalist elite to consolidate state power under an ethnically and religious 
homogeneous populace of Turkish/Islamic identity. Hence, the deportation 
(“tehcir”) was directly aimed at displacing the Armenian people from their 
Anatolian homeland and to eliminate large sections of this ethnic group in the 
process. Within a few years’ time a tenth of the entire Anatolian population was 
wiped out. Even today, the traumatic traces of the nationalist project keep hold 
over Turkey, as society persists in a state of collective amnesia and an insistent 
refusal to acknowledge the true dimensions of what happened (Akçam 2005). 
2 .2 . ethnic nationaliSm and migration in the repuBlican era
The forced displacement and death of Christian Ottoman subjects and 
the inflow of Muslim refugees in the first quarter of the twentieth century 
significantly changed the ethnic and religious composition of Turkish society. 
Between 1913 and 1923, the share of the Christian population in the area 
that today constitutes Turkey declined from 20 per cent to 2.5 per cent 
(Keyder 2003:43). Consequently, the nation building process that followed 
the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was heavily biased towards 
“Turkishness” as a constitutive characteristic of national belonging. Even 
though Armenians, Greeks and Jews had been recognized as minorities in 
the Lausanne Treaty of 1924, a significant discrepancy emerged between the 
formally civic and substantively ethnic/religious definitions of citizenship in 
Turkey (Kiris¸çi 2000). Turkish Jews for example, were temporarily subjected 
to a discriminatory wealth tax during WWII and those unable to pay were 
detained (Levi 1998). The Greek population of Istanbul, although exempt 
from the population exchange, diminished from 110,000 in 1923 to 2,500 
in 2003 through emigration caused by discrimination and sporadic violence 
(Oran 2003). A large proportion of other indigenous non-Muslim populations, 
such as Süryanis, Chaldeans and Yezidis also left (Danıs¸ 2004:219). The 
ethnicized practices of citizenship also affected the Kurdish population. They 
were subjected to a series of forced resettlement policies and to policies of 
cultural and political othering (Yeg˘en 1999). During the 1990s, many villages 
were depopulated and over one million Kurdish people internally displaced in 
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the struggles between Kurdish insurgents and state security forces in south-
eastern Turkey (Erdem/Özevin/Özselçuk 2003; TESEV 2005; Ayata/Yükseker 
2005).  
The discriminatory practices of citizenship also found reflection in the 
republic’s immigration policies. The 1934 Law on Settlement for example, 
restricted the right to immigration to persons of “Turkish descent and culture”. 
As Kiris¸çi notes, immigration practice had a strong religious overtone:
 “Unlike the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has in public emphasized Turkish 
language and ethnic affiliation in respect to its immigration policies and remained 
silent in respect to religion. Yet, the actual practice reveals a striking preference 
for admitting immigrants with a Sunni and Hanefi religious background. … 
Though Turkey has been willing to extend asylum to a broad range of people, 
it has restricted full refugee status only to people who qualify as potential 
immigrants.”4 
Through this selective immigration policy, over 825,000 Muslim Balkan 
refugees (Turks, Pomaks, Roma, Tatars, Circassians, Bosnians, Albanians) settled 
in Turkey between 1923 and 19395, while  “Christian Orthodox Gagauz Turks 
and Shi’a Azeris, in spite of their explicit reference to Turkish descent, appear 
to have been denied the possibility to migrate to Turkey.”6 The emigration 
of Turks from Western Thrace in Greece (the other group exempted from 
the “population exchange”) on the other hand, was discouraged by Turkish 
authorities with the nationalistic aim of maintaining a Turkish presence in the 
region (Kiris¸ci 2000).
Under the Law on Settlement, a further 860,000 people from Balkan 
countries migrated to Turkey between 1940 and 1995. Migrants from 
Yugoslavia made up 22 per cent, but the vast majority consisted of Pomaks 
and Turks from Bulgaria. There were two large waves of immigration: the first 
one in 1950-51 when 154,000 people arrived in Turkey, and again in 1989 
when 310,000 crossed the border. Around 40,000 more people migrated to 
Turkey on the basis of family unification in the 1970s (Kiris¸çi 2000). 
The 1989 emigration wave followed renewed measures taken by Bulgarian 
authorities to forcefully assimilate Turkish speaking communities (9.5 per cent 
of the population). When the freedom to travel was granted in May 1989, 
many people took the chance to emigrate to Turkey. The social integration of 
Bulgarian migrants was facilitated by bi-national kinship networks sustained 
by earlier migrants, general societal acceptance and substantial support from 
NGOs, the government and international organisations. Still, disappointed 
with the lack of employment opportunities in Turkey and encouraged by the 
regime change in Bulgaria, around 40 per cent of émigrés chose to return 
to Bulgaria in the early 1990s. Although the ethnicisation of conflicts over 
access to resources in Bulgaria continues to pose a challenge, the possibility 
4 Kiris¸çi (2000), p.3.
5 Kiris¸çi (2000), p.7-8 and Table 1, p.8.
6 Kiris¸çi (2000), p.14
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of emigration to Turkey substantially strengthens their fall back position (Van 
Hear 1998; Vasileva 2005).   
While Turkey’s ethnically defined immigration policy allowed for the 
settlement of Bulgarians and Yugoslavs, its own citizens had to seek asylum in 
Western (and to a limited extent Eastern) European countries. After democracy 
and human rights had been suspended by the coup d’état in September 1980, 
around 240,000 Turkish citizens filed asylum claims in Europe7. The number 
of asylum claims by Kurds with Turkish citizenship soared in the 1990s. As 
the struggle between the Turkish armed forces and Kurdish guerrillas led to 
massive human rights violations and internal displacement, over 424,000 
asylum applications were filed in the 1990-2002 period (Table 1). 
taBle 1: aSylum applicationS By turkiSh citizenS in europe, 1980-2002
Number of claims filed
1980-1984 90,046
1985-1989 152,469
1990-1994 183,007
1995-1999 154,392
2000-2002 86,822
Source: UNHCR (2001), Tables I.18, II.20, III.27, IV.42 and UNHCR (2003a), Table 8.
2 .3 . the policy of de facto protection towardS non-turkic refugeeS
On a number of occasions, Turkey extended de facto protection to various 
groups of refugees. During WWII, Turkey provided refuge to 800 German 
Jewish professionals and allowed many others to transit the country. Turkey 
also became a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, but applies a 
geographical reservation that restricts eligibility for refugee status to European 
citizens. During the Cold War, around 8,100 asylum claims by CEE nationals 
were filed with Turkish authorities. These refugees were largely resettled in third 
countries by the UNHCR or the International Catholic Migration Commission 
(Kiris¸çi 2000:11). 
Still, this humanitarian policy has been circumscribed by ethnically defined 
security concerns. While Iraqi Turkomans were recognized as refugees and 
granted immigrant status in Turkey, Arab and Kurdish refugees from Middle 
Eastern countries had to accept a less secure status. For example, 50,000 
Kurdish Iraqis who fled to Turkey in 1988 were only granted temporary asylum 
for fear of a stronger Kurdish presence within Turkey. Again during the Gulf 
crisis in 1990-91, more than 460,000 Iraqi Kurds fled to Southern Turkey, 
and were hosted in temporary shelters in the vicinity of the border. Through 
diplomatic and military intervention at UN level, a “safe haven” was created 
in northern Iraq and the vast majority of refugees were rapidly repatriated 
7 UNHCR (2001), Tables I.18, II.20, III.27, IV.42.
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to Iraq8. Around 60,000 labour migrants from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka, who had been working in Iraq and Kuwait, were repatriated to 
their countries of origin via Turkey. As Kiris¸çi 2000 remarks, the differences in 
Turkey’s policies towards the Bulgarian Turkish and Pomak refugees in 1989 
on the one hand and the Kurdish refugees in 1991 on the other, reflect the 
ethnic bias in Turkish refugee policy: As outlined in the previous section, the 
borders were quickly opened to Bulgarian refugees and a national effort was 
launched to socially and economically integrate the refugees, including rapid 
access to Turkish citizenship. The humanitarian help offered to Iraqi Kurds 
in contrast, was geared towards rapid repatriation. The Kurds did not have 
access to the labour market in Turkey, either formally or informally. Meanwhile, 
around 50,000 Turkoman Iraqis were resettled in central Anatolia and were 
subsequently granted permanent residence9. 
During the war in Bosnia in the early 1990s, around 25,000 Bosnians were 
granted refuge in Turkey, but were not officially recognized as refugees by the 
authorities. Most of them stayed with Turkish relatives of Bosnian descent, 
and around 2,500-3,000 of them were settled in a UNHCR supported 
camp near the Bulgarian border (Kümbetog˘lu 2003:246). Compared to the 
Bulgarian migrants of 1989, the Bosnian refugees also experienced substantial 
discrimination, both on the labour market and in accessing social services. 
Their “temporary guest” status did not entitle them to work permits. As a result, 
many skilled refugees were forced to take up low paid jobs in the informal 
economy. The economic hardship motivated most refugees to return to Bosnia 
after the Dayton agreement of 1995, or to seek asylum and settle in a third 
country (Kiris¸çi 2000; 2003). A small minority stayed on and 3,000 persons 
eventually obtained Turkish citizenship. Similarly, 20,000 Kosovo Albanians 
temporarily sought refuge in Turkey during the crisis in 1999. They also mostly 
returned to Kosovo or engage in circular migration between the two countries 
(Içduygu 2003: 23; Kiris¸çi  2003)
Beside these cases of de facto protection, asylum claims filed in Turkey 
also increased in the 1990s (Table 2), mainly from Iranians and Iraqis (UNHCR 
2003b:346). Turkish authorities process these applications in cooperation with 
the UNHCR (Kiris¸çi 2003:64-65; Corliss 2003), but the geographical reservation 
to the Geneva Convention implies that non-European refugees continue to be 
resettled in third countries, mostly in North America and Australia10.  
8 Kiris¸çi (2000), p.12-13.
9 Kiris¸çi (2000), p.13-14.
10 www.egm.gov.tr/yabancılar
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taBle 2: aSylum applicationS in turkey, 1970-2003
Number of applications filed
1970-1974 300
1975-1979 371
1980-1984 4,232
1985-1989 12,024
1990-1994 24,386
1995-1999 26,458
2000-2003 18,473
Source: UNHCR (2001), Tables I.15, II.17, III.22, IV.34, VI.15, VI.22 and UNHCR (2003b), Table A, p.346.
3 . turkey aS a country of tranSit migration
In the post WWII period, Turkey has served as a transit country for Iranian 
and Syrian Jews en route to Israel (Kiris¸çi 2000). Overall, up to 1.5 million 
Iranian citizens are estimated to have arrived in Turkey en route to Europe 
and North America since the Islamic regime came to power in 1979. Until 
recently, they were legally permitted to enter the country without a visa11, and 
many overstay the allowed 90 days until they have arranged a transit route to 
join one of the established Iranian communities abroad (Içduygu 2003; Kiris¸çi 
2000:11). Iraqi Chaldeans are known to follow a similar strategy of transit 
migration (Danıs¸ 2004:223).
The major novelty for Turkey, lies in the substantial flows of transit migration 
from the “Global South”, primarily the Middle East, Asia and Africa to Western 
countries. These self-organised migration flows have been ascribed to two 
major factors. First, as EU member states dismantled much of their asylum 
systems and tightened border regimes at the peripheries of the EU, Turkey 
was most conveniently placed to serve as an alternative transit route to enter 
Europe without documents. Secondly, wars and political turmoil in the Middle 
East, Asia and Africa have increased the inflow of refugees and transit migrants 
from these regions (Içduygu 2003:18-19).
Does this make Turkey a country with a “laissez passer” policy? Yes and 
no. _çduygu estimates “the annual number of transit migrants in an irregular 
situation in Turkey … to be around 200,000.” (Içduygu 2003: 8). These figures 
suggest that Turkey has followed a fairly liberal policy towards transit migration. 
However, in the last few years, an increasing number of undocumented foreign 
nationals have been intercepted by Turkish police authorities12. The policy 
change is closely related to the pressure to comply with the EU border regime 
as a condition of the EU acquis. To this end, Turkey has taken several steps 
11 On February 11, 2005 the foreign minister Abdullah Gül announced that in line with the EU acquis, 
a visa requirement was being introduced for Iranian citizens. (Radikal, February 11, 2005)
12 The figures are 94,000 persons in 2000, 84,000 in 2002 and 54,000 in 2003. Migrants from over 
160 countries were intercepted, but most of them were nationals of Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Moldavia 
and Pakistan (Içduygu 2004:8; Terziog˘lu 2004 ).
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to intensify border controls, to harmonize Turkish visa policy with Schengen 
practice, to combat the trafficking and smuggling of persons, and to regularize 
the processing of asylum claims (Kiris¸çi 2003). The 2005 National Action 
Plan on Asylum and Migration introduced the fast-track processing of asylum 
applications. The establishment of several “reception centres” for asylum 
seekers and detention centres for deporting apprehended undocumented 
migrants is planned13. Readmission agreements are being negotiated with 
several sending countries in collaboration with international organisations such 
as IOM and UNHCR (Içduygu 2003; Terziog˘lu 2004; European Commission 
2004b). From the European Commission’s perspective:
… during the pre-accession period the fight against illegal migration should 
be strengthened by improved exchange of information, statistics and risk 
management between the current Member states and Turkey, the development 
of public information campaigns, liaison concerning the repatriation of illegal 
migrants to their countries of origin and co-operation on dismantling networks 
of migrants’ smugglers and traffickers14.
The European Commission’s statement makes it clear that as well as 
introducing legislative changes, Turkey is expected both to end a “laissez 
passer” practice towards transit migration and to criminalize undocumented 
migrants through public “information” campaigns that highlight the “illegality” 
of irregular migrants. There is some parallel here with the United States, as 
described by De Genova (2002: 436):
“Overstaying a visa – the rather discrete act by which very significant 
numbers of people become undocumented migrants – is, after all, not terribly 
dramatic. Hence, it is precisely “the Border” that provides the exemplary 
theater for staging the spectacle of “the illegal alien” that the law produces. 
The elusiveness of the law, and its relative invisibility in producing “illegality”, 
requires the spectacle of “enforcement” at the U.S.-Mexico border that renders 
a racialized migrant “illegality” visible and lends it the commonsensical air of a 
“natural” fact.”
It appears that similar efforts have already started in Turkey. Increased 
media coverage of security forces’ apprehension of migrants circulates visual 
images of border enforcement and simultaneously generates the impression 
of a massive and continuous inflow of “illegal foreigners”. To give an example, 
Turkish Daily News featured several articles on the topic within a short period 
of time:
“Acting on a tip, the Tatvan gendarmerie in the eastern Anatolian province of 
Bitlis yesterday apprehended 67 people who entered the country illegally. … A 
gendarmerie spokesman said they would be deported following interrogation. 
The Anatolia news agency said the illegal migrants were mostly Pakistani 
nationals.”15 (May 25, 2005)
13  http://www.amnesty-turkiye.org
14 European Commission (2004a), p.42.
15 http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14099
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“Security forces captured a total of 56 illegal migrants in the western port 
city of Izmir and in the northwestern province of Edirne just before the groups 
attempted to cross the Greek border. … During a routine patrol carried out by 
Edirne gendarmerie teams, 51 migrants from Iraq, Pakistan and Mauritania 
were apprehended and sent to the Edirne police department. Meanwhile, 
five other Mauritanian citizens who entered Turkey illegally were rescued and 
detained near the Dikili region of Izmir. Greek Coast Guard boats reportedly 
left the migrants in the sea with life jackets.”16 (June 8, 2005)
“Acting on a tip off gendarmerie teams captured 64 immigrants on a small 
island near Foça, Izmir, trying to sneak into Greece. The gendarmerie said that 
among the illegal immigrants were Mauritanian, Somalian and Palestinian 
nationals. The illegal immigrants said human traffickers had taken them to 
Orak island and told them that the island was in Greek territory. A group 
of 66 illegal immigrants were captured in Manisa.The immigrants from Iraq, 
Palestine, Sudan. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya and Ethiopia all 
tried to enter Greece from Turkey.”17 (June 11, 2005) 
These news articles are indicative of the autonomy of migratory flows 
despite border controls. Yaghmaian 2005 gives a moving account of transit 
migrants’ lives at different points of their journey to the West. He extensively 
narrates their diverse motives for migration, their resourcefulness, but 
also the precariousness, hardship and despair experienced by those who 
are unable to move on. Indeed, migrants with no access to legal routes of 
migration to Western countries have to rely on smugglers to cross the borders 
undocumented - a situation that generates an informal economy of its own.  In 
Turkey, transit routes established in the late 1980s to facilitate Kurdish asylum 
in Europe, have now been adapted to smuggle Asian, Middle Eastern and 
African migrants through Turkey. These have been coordinated with traditional 
networks for smuggling goods at the eastern borders of Turkey. Accordingly, 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus constitute the main entry points for 
undocumented transit migrants18. The main departure points out of Turkey 
are the borders with Bulgaria and Greece as well as the Mediterranean coast, 
particularly towns that are in proximity to the Greek islands in the Aegean 
Sea.
Looked at from the perspective of the local population in eastern Turkey, 
more than two decades of armed struggle between the Turkish army forces 
and Kurdish insurgents have further damaged an economically disadvantaged 
region - destroying the animal husbandry sector and reinforcing the image of 
smuggling as an ethnically distinct livelihood strategy. One Kurdish smuggler 
informant of Içduygu 2003 is worth citing at length in this context:
“Smuggling is the basis of the region’s economy. Everything you can imagine 
travels over the border... In a system like this, it makes no difference if we are 
16 http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=15214
17 http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=15517
18 www.egm.gov.tr/yabancılar/birincisf.htm
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carrying spare car parts, diesel fuel or people. The fundamental rule of capitalism 
operates here; it is a matter of supply and demand. On the thousand years old 
Silk Road, whatever item is needed is smuggled. At that time, the borders we 
have did not exist. Travelling that route was not considered smuggling. There 
were only different taxes at different stops. But now ... it is illegal to cross 
without notification. My relatives on the other side of the border are larger in 
number than the ones on this side of the border... This kind of a relationship is 
an advantage for all sorts of smuggling... It works like an insurance.”19 
Based on interviews with smugglers, Içduygu 2003 concludes that in Turkey, 
the illegal entry and transit of migrants is organised not by an international 
mafia, but rather through a loose, flexible network of locally based persons who 
financially benefit from involvement in people smuggling. To give an example, 
a local guide may help migrants cross the border into eastern Turkey, another 
person will accompany them to a destination in the western part of the country, a 
middleman takes them to the person who will arrange the passage from Turkey, 
yet another person will accompany the migrants on the border crossing and 
so on. Depending on the situation, the network is augmented through different 
local intermediaries20. Içduygu also reports of a Turkish garment subcontractor 
who employed Afghan and Iraqi transit migrants “because they were cheaper”. 
Approached by his employees to act as a safeguard for the smugglers’ fee until 
they reached their destination, he eventually came to specialize in smuggling 
transit migrants (92). Hence Içduygu’s conclusion that:  
“... our impression is that of a loosely cast network, consisting of hundreds 
of independent smaller units which cooperate along the way. It is the flexibility 
and adaptability offered by these that ensures the continuing activity and 
success of the larger operation, since, even if one link along the chain should 
break, it can be immediately replaced without risking the disintegration of the 
whole.”21 
Despite the flexible nature of the network, transit migration remains a 
dangerous endeavour for the migrants. The death toll continues to be tragically 
high, as a selection of recent newspaper reports document: 
“At the Turkish coast of the Aegean Sea, a ship with refugees from Somalia 
and Iran capsized on Sunday. One person was killed. Twelve other refugees 
were rescued by the Turkish coast guard, one refugee and the captain are 
still missing. The occupants wanted to get illegally to the Greek island of 
Lesbos.”22
“Two migrants from Mauritania and Tunisia were killed as they stepped on 
landmines while trying to cross the border from Turkey to Greece. A third person 
was rescued wounded by the Greek border patrol. The death toll through Greek 
landmines dating from the 1940s has risen to 72 within two years.”23
19 Içduygu 2003, p.79. See also the films A Time for Drunken Horses and Marooned in Iraq by 
director Bahman Ghobadi for informal trade relations on the Iran-Iraq border.
20 Içduygu 2003, p.45.
21 Içduygu 2003, p.49.
22 own translation. die tageszeitung, January 3, 2005
23 own translation. Radikal, April 6, 2005
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“Turkish gendarmes chasing a bus with 36 illegal immigrants from Afghanistan 
opened fire, killing one person, wounding three others. It was reported that the 
security forces in Muradiye, near Lake Van in Eastern Turkey fired at the bus 
because the driver did not want to stop and tried to flee.”24
4 . traJectorieS of laBour emigration 
4 .1 . laBour emigration to european countrieS
During the “golden age of capitalism” Turkey, alongside with other Southern 
European countries, became a country of significant labour emigration to Western 
Europe. An interlocking economic regime characterised by macroeconomic 
stability, Fordist mass industrial production, the Bretton-Woods monetary 
system, institutionalized wage setting and welfare state expansion sustained 
rapid economic growth in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s (Marglin/Schor 
1990; Armstrong/Glyn/Harrison 1991). With unemployment running at three 
per cent or less25, European countries responded to the persistent excess 
demand on the labour market with a massive drive to recruit migrant workers 
(Castles/Kosack 1973). 
In this context, Turkey signed labour migration agreements with Germany 
(1961), Netherlands (1964), Belgium (1965), France (1967) and Sweden 
(1967)26. The “golden age” thus opened up novel employment opportunities 
for the Turkish labour force at the international level. Between 1961 and 1973, 
a total of 790,000 migrant workers, around a quarter of them women, were 
placed in jobs in Western Europe (Table 3). Another 120,000-150,000 people 
are thought to have self-organised their labour migration 27. 
taBle 3: maJor countrieS of laBour emigration from turkey, 1961-1973
Total number of recruited migrant workers 
Germany 648,029
France 45,366
Austria 34,459
Netherlands 23,359
Belgium 15,309
Source: Martin (1991), Table 1, p.22-23.
For purposes of illustration, let us focus on Germany, the major recipient of 
migrants from Turkey. The German migration regime instituted a hierarchy of 
social, political and economic rights based on nationality (Karakayalı/Tsianos 
2002). At the economic level, the migration regime reflected the corporatist 
compromise between trade unions and German capital. The “Inländerprimat” 
24 own translation. die tageszeitung, April 16/17, 2005.
25 Glyn et al. 1990: Table 2.6, p.47.
26 http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/migration/chapter9.html, Chapter 2.1.
27 Martin (1991), Table 1, p.22 and p.3, p.25.
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regulation gave German workers priority access to vacant jobs, while allowing 
employers to draw on an international supply of labour. Since migrant workers 
were explicitly recruited for jobs that could not filled through recourse to the 
domestic labour market, migrants’ distribution across occupations and sectors 
was highly uneven. In 1973 for instance, 74 per cent of female migrants and 88 
per cent of male migrants worked in industry28; the vast majority held low-skill 
jobs29. On the other hand, trade [unions] efforts to prevent wage competition 
ensured that migrant workers were paid the same wages and benefits as set in 
collective bargaining agreements for their domestic counterparts in the same 
skill category. 
However, after the oil shock of 1973 the labour migration programme was 
terminated. Deindustrialization and a more stringent implementation of the 
“Inländerprimat” led to a rapid increase in the migrant rate of unemployment 
(Dohse 1981; Erdem/Mattes 2003). Nonetheless, migration continued through 
family reunification and a process of settlement started. Today, the economic 
pressure to emigrate from Turkey remains intense, as the income effect of a 
series of IMF structural adjustment programs has largely been negative (Balkan 
and Savran 2004). The transnational networks established in the 1960s and 
1970s sustain the process of Turkish migration to Europe, reinforcing the existing 
spatial pattern of Turkish denizenship across Europe (Ünalan 2003:146-149). 
By the year 2001, the population of Turkish origin in Europe exceeded 3.3 
million (including naturalized persons), with migrant communities in Germany, 
the Netherlands and France accounting for the highest share (Table 4).  
taBle 4: migrantS from turkey in europe: turkiSh and naturaliSed citizenS, 2001
Stock of Turkish citizens 2001 
(thousands)
Persons who acquired host 
country nationality 
1992-2001
(thousands)
Austria 127.2 56.7
Belgium 45.9 75.8
Denmark 33.4 15.0
France* 208 39.9
Germany 1947.9 406.3
Netherlands 100.3 167.2
Sweden 13.9 22.5
Switzerland 79.5 17.5
Total 2,556.1 800.9
*) France: 1999.
Source:  OECD (2004), SOPEMI. Tables B.1.5 and B.1.6; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für 
Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration (2004), Table 3. 
28 Own calculations based on ANBA Arbeitsstatistik 1973 – Jahreszahlen, Übersicht 10, pp.26-29.
29 König/Schultze/Wessel 1986, Tab. 55/1, p. 85 and Tab. 59, p.95
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At the political level, there is great variation in migrants’ rights across 
Europe, with Germany probably implementing one of the most restrictive 
regimes. The Aliens’ Act (“Ausländergesetz”), which was operative until 2005, 
codified practices of institutional discrimination. Despite the very presence 
of migrants, policymakers upheld the motto that “Germany is not a country 
of immigration” for decades. Hence, virtually no steps were taken to ensure 
migrants’ access to full social, economic or political citizenship. The Citizenship 
Act was only changed in the year 2000 to allow (to a limited extent) for the 
acquisition of citizenship based on ius soli30 . The first Immigration Act (officially 
named the Act to Restrict and Manage Immigration) was put into practice in 
2005. While the Act acknowledges immigration as a fact, it puts the burden 
on immigrants to prove that they deserve being granted full legal equality 
(Karakayalı/Tsianos 2005). This shift in the migration regime finds reflection in 
current debates on the failure of migrant “integration” and their alleged refusal/
inability to internalize European values (Erdem 2006).  
 
4 .2 . laBour migration in the context of contract work 
While the situation of the Turkish diaspora in Europe continues to be 
hotly debated in the wake of Turkey’s EU candidacy, much less attention has 
been paid to migratory flows to the Middle East. The oil shock of 1973 had 
terminated the European labour migration programmes, but opened up the 
doors of Middle Eastern countries for Turkish migrants. In the 1974-1987 
period, around 395,000 contract workers were recruited for jobs in the 
construction sector in Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq (Table 5)31. 
taBle 5: maJor countrieS of laBour migration from turkey, 1974-1987
Total number of recruited migrant workers 
Saudi Arabia 185,613
Libya 174,559
Iraq 34,667
Europe 33,397
Source: Martin (1991), Table 1, p.22-23.
Since the 1990s, the overall figures have been much lower due to the end of 
the boom in infrastructural investment in Middle Eastern countries (Figure 1). 
However, new destination countries have emerged, among them Israel and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Erder 2003:160). Turkish workers 
have also benefited from the contract worker programs introduced by the 
European Union, particularly in Germany. Yet, contract work in CIS countries 
30 ius soli refers to the right to citizenship deriving from birth on that nation state’s territory. Beauftragte 
der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration (2005).
31 Martin (1991),  Table 1, p.23
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has fluctuated due to economic instability in Russia (OECD 2000: 262). On the 
other hand, political instability in Israel has resulted in the withdrawal of many 
firms, reportedly allowing a single Turkish company to capture the market 
for Israeli contract work. This company benefits from an off-set agreement, 
according to which the sale of military equipment to Israel is paid in the form 
of contracts to the aforementioned Turkish company32. The extent to which 
these new flows of labour migration may generate new settled communities, 
particularly in the Middle East, constitutes an important question that calls for 
further research33.  
figure 1: laBour emigration from turkey By deStination, 1994-2002
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5 . irregular migration to turkey and the informal economy 
As outline above, Turkey has been a country of labour emigration from the 
1960s onwards. Yet beginning with the 1990s Turkey, along with other Southern 
European countries, has witnessed the phenomenon of clandestine labour 
immigration. Rising unemployment and poverty following the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union have led many Eastern Europeans to turn to neighbouring 
Turkey for income generating activities. Transit migrants and asylum seekers 
also seek out employment opportunities on the Turkish labour market in order 
to secure their livelihood and to save up for the next leg of their journey.
The precarious legal status of migrants leaves informality as their only 
option for economic participation. But does the Turkish labour market have the 
flexibility to accommodate migrant workers? And how are migrants positioned 
in informal economic structures? The argument could be made that informality 
32 Radikal, April 2, 2006.
33 I am grateful to Didem Danıs¸ for drawing my attention to this point.
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does not put migrants at disadvantage per se, since the informal economy 
constitutes an important reference point for the domestic labour force as 
well. The widespread nature of informality could thus be hypothesized as an 
enabling factor for migrants to secure their livelihood. No doubt, the Turkish 
labour market does not correspond to the open economy model. But if it were 
the case that migrants can participate in the Turkish economy irrespective of 
their legal status, could the argument be made that a de facto “laissez faire” 
policy towards labour migration prevails in Turkey? Below, we reflect on this 
hypothesis in light of empirical research findings available so far on migrant 
economic activities in Turkey.   
Before engaging with the empirical evidence however, let us briefly outline 
the structure of employment in Turkey. In 2004, agriculture accounted for 34 
per cent of total employment; the respective shares of industry and services 
were 23 per cent and 43 per cent34. Table 6 disaggregates employment by 
sector and gender:
taBle 6: diStriBution of employment in turkey By Sector and gender, 2004 (%)
Men Women
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing 25.6 57.2
Mining and quarrying 0.6 0.0
Manufacturing 18.8 13.5
Electricity, gas and water 0.5 0.1
Construction 6.3 0.5
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels 22.9 8.7
Transportation, communication and storage 6.5 1.1
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services 3.6 3.7
Community, social and personal services 15.2 15.2
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on DIE (2004), Tab. 10.4, p.152.
OECD estimates suggest that in Turkey the informal economy accounts for 
roughly half of total employment and for more than a third of non-agricultural 
employment (OECD 2004: 187). At this point, let us also clarify the definition 
of informality used in this paper. Rather than limit our discussion to the informal 
sector (narrowly defined as employment in informal sector enterprises), we 
employ the concept of “informal employment”. The latter takes into account 
diverse forms of precarious work, thus allowing for the analysis of production, 
distribution and employment relations along a continuum ranging from the 
formal to the informal (Hussmanns 2004).  In this sense informal employment 
refers to “... all forms of … employment without contracts (i.e. covered by labour 
legislation), worker benefits or social protection – both inside and outside 
34 DIE (2004), Tab. 10.4, p.152.
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informal enterprises.” (Chen 2005: 7) This broader definition is particularly 
relevant for an analysis of the Turkish labour market, where the OECD identifies 
three different forms of informality: 
“i) entire companies fail to register as legal entities; ii) registered companies 
employ undeclared workers; and iii) registered companies declare lower wages 
than those actually paid to their registered workers.” (OECD 2004: 42)
In the non-agricultural sector, informality occurs in the form of dependent 
employment (58 per cent), own account work (30 per cent) and unpaid family 
work (12 per cent) (TÜSIAD 2004: 36). Although informality has been an issue 
for a long time, the size of the informal economy has grown rapidly since the 
1980s. The development paradigm centred on a state led import substitution 
regime35 had reached its limits by the 1970s and was unable to generate 
sufficient regular employment (Pamuk 2003). As population growth and the 
mechanization of agriculture impoverished large sections of the peasantry, 
rural to urban migration accelerated. Informal economic structures in trade 
and production developed, catering not only to the ever growing number of 
shanty town residents but also to local industries. Moreover, the 1980 coup 
d’état dramatically shifted the balance between capital and labour (Öngen 
2003). Trade union activity was first banned, and then strictly circumscribed. 
Consequently, real wages declined by 40 per cent in the 1980-1988 period 
(Özar/Ercan 2004). As the economy was liberalized under a series of structural 
adjustment programs, employers were able to further informalize employment 
relations (Boratav/Yeldan/Köse 2000; Ercan 2004; Özar/Ercan 2004). 
From 1990 to 2003, the share of informal employment in non-agricultural 
employment increased from 25 per cent to 31.5 per cent, accounting for 47 
per cent of job growth outside of agriculture36. Experts observed “increased 
subcontracting, home-working, contract labour and temporary forms of 
employment.” (Peker 1996: 9) Informality is particularly widespread in small 
enterprises with low productivity and human capital, but larger enterprises 
also engage in underreporting in order to save on labour costs and to avoid 
taxes and regulatory responsibilities. 
Yet, the degree of informality varies substantially across sectors. In 2003, 
apart from agriculture, the share of not registered workers was particularly high 
in manufacturing (30.7 per cent), construction (63.8 per cent), trade, hotels 
and restaurants (42.2 per cent) and in transport, communication and storage 
(43.9 per cent). Industries with a strong tradition of unionisation or public 
sector involvement such as mining, utilities, finance or community social and 
personal services on the other hand, showed much lower rates of informality 
(OECD 2004: 188, Table 4.6). On average, wages of informal workers were half 
as high as those of their formally employed colleagues (TÜSIAD 2004: 38-39, 
35 According to Aktar 2003, the public sector had to take on a defining role to modernize and 
nationalize the economy after the expulsion and massacre of the Ottoman entrepreneurial and 
merchant classes, consisting largely of Greeks and Armenians, during the post WW I period. See also 
Keyder 1987.
eSra erdem
105
46). Interestingly enough, no significant gender gap could be found in terms 
of the degree of informality or the earnings gap between formal and informal 
employment (44).   
Given the centrality of informal economic activity in Turkey, it is not surprising 
that the degree of formal labour market integration remains even low among 
nonnationals with proper documentation such as spouses of Turkish citizens, 
EU citizens of Turkish origin and descendants of West European immigrants to 
the Ottoman Empire (Italian, French, Portuguese traders, Jewish refugees)37. 
They are often pushed into the informal economy because work permits are 
bureaucratically cumbersome to obtain, they are employer specific (meaning 
that they have to be renewed with each new job contract) and many employers 
are simply reluctant to offer formally binding employment contracts (Kaiser 
2003; Erder/Kaska 2003:40). Hence, official statistics on the employment of 
non-nationals are highly biased towards professionals: they record that 40 per 
cent work in managerial positions or as business partners, and another 33 
per cent are employed as consultants or managing directors of companies’ 
marketing departments (Lordog˘lu 2005: 117, Table 6).
Empirical research findings on irregular migrants presented below show 
that the economic activities of migrant women from CEE countries constitute a 
distinct profile, characterized by occupational crowding in market niches such 
as informal transnational trading, domestic work and sex work. However, the 
overall economic presence of undocumented migrants in informal employment 
remains surprisingly weak. Informal labour markets obviously do not clear, 
rendering migrants’ incorporation into the Turkish economic landscape 
conditional upon a multiplicity of factors such as access to informal economy 
networks, gender, ethnicity, skills, financial resources and legal status. To 
substantiate this argument, let us examine migrants’ economic profiles in 
detail.
 
5 .1 . tranSnational circular migration
Circular migration by Eastern European petty traders started in the 1980s, 
with Polish traders buying goods in Turkey and selling these in the Soviet 
Union. In the 1990s, it developed into a major transnational informal economy 
involving traders from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria and 
Azerbaijan, whose trade was estimated in 2001 at $3 billion38. 
The term “suitcase trader” or “chelnok” denotes small scale, informal 
entrepreneurs who operate in market niches of international trade (Yükseker 
2003). They predominantly belong to low income groups who make a living by 
taking advantage of international differentials in prices, tariffs and exchange 
rates. Suitcase trading is a gendered occupation in the sense that gender 
discrimination on CEE labour markets in the “transition period” led many 
37 Kaiser (2003: 271-272). Merely 14 per cent of documented nonnationals held work permits in 
2001 (Erder 2003: 163).
38 Yükseker (2003), Table 1.1, p.15.
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women to take up cross border trade. Travelling on tourist visas39, suitcase 
traders buy garments, footwear and leather goods in Turkey, transport these 
as “passenger luggage” to their home country40, and sell them on local 
markets – often using undocumented migrants (for instance, Ukrainians and 
White Russians in Moscow) as salespersons. In this way, the suitcase trade 
directly links the informal economies of transition economies to that of Turkey 
(Yükseker 2003). 
The suitcase trade is concentrated in the Laleli district in the historic 
centre of Istanbul. It is akin to an industrial district in that it interacts with a 
whole variety of industries through backward and forward linkages: wholesale 
and retail trade; small scale manufacturers (and their subcontractors) in 
clothing, footwear, leather goods; freight transportation to the airport; hotels, 
restaurants, night clubs, travel agencies catering to suitcase traders. Trade 
and garment manufacturing in particular involve chains of informal economic 
activities; business relations between retailers and suitcase traders also remain 
unrecorded. The evasion of tax at the point of sale (VAT) and at the border 
(tariffs) is tolerated by the authorities due to the high value of exports generated. 
While the overall volume of trade may be high, competition among traders 
and the weak purchasing power of the Eastern European clientele keep profit 
margins of suitcase traders low, thus preventing rapid capital accumulation.
Yükseker 2003 observes that Laleli links not only the informal economies 
of Eastern Europe and Turkey but also the socially and/or economically 
marginalized populations in these countries. In the 1980s, Turkish citizens 
of Bosnian descent were the first to open shops catering to suitcase traders, 
followed by Turkish citizens of Arab ethnicity. In the 1990s, internal displacement 
increased the Kurdish presence in Laleli. Today, Turkish migrants from Bulgaria 
dominate among the employees, while Kurds constitute the majority among 
the business owners. Bosnian refugees, Bulgarian Turks, Azeris, Moldavians 
and Ukrainians can also find work as sales staff, translators and travel agents in 
Laleli due to their Russian language skills; oftentimes they hope to save enough 
money to start suitcase trading themselves. 
While Laleli clearly dominates suitcase trading, ever since the Turkey-
Georgia border crossing reopened in 1989, the Black Sea coast of Turkey has 
constituted a lesser centre where circular migration and trade intersect.  In 
contrast to chelnoks who frequent Laleli exclusively to purchase goods, traders 
from Georgia and Armenia act both as sellers and buyers on the markets along 
the Black Sea coast. The complexity of chelnoks’ self-organised trade networks 
is exemplified in Yükseker’s account of Linda, an Armenian-Polish chelnok:
39 Currently, Bulgarian citizens are exempt from the visa obligation on trips up to 90 days. Migrants 
from Albania and CIS may, depending on nationality, obtain tourist visas for between 15 and 60 
days at the border. (http://www.egm.gov.tr/duyurular)  Even if they overstay, they often re-enter after 
paying a fine.
40 The goods are declared under the category of passenger luggage, but in fact the freight is carried 
on separate cargo planes or busses. 
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“Linda travels to Konya in central Turkey to buy cheap footwear and 
garments, and to Urfa and Kilis in Eastern Turkey to buy Chinese porcelain and 
viscose silk cloth. She sells these goods on the market in Ordu, the Black sea 
town of Turkey, where she has been living for three years. She goes to Georgia 
once a month to renew her visa, takes garments with her on this trip and sells 
them in Georgia. While in Georgia, she buys Indian garments from a chelnok 
commuting between India and Georgia, and sells them in Ordu in Turkey.”41
Operating as sellers on Turkish markets, these petty traders compete 
with local traders and may incur their hostility. On the other hand, some 
local retailers use the opportunity to establish new supplier networks with 
the migrants, thus expanding their customer base transnationally (Hann and 
Beller-Hann 1998: 249). While some migrants succeed in making a living in this 
way, there are a number of factors that impede suitcase trading in the region. 
First, armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics negatively influence trade. 
Secondly, female migrant traders in north-eastern Turkey often experience 
ethnicised stigmatization and sexual harassment from the local population 
(Hann and Beller-Hann 1998). Thirdly, the Black Sea region fails to compete 
with Laleli in terms of either the price and quality of goods or the availability of 
complementary services such as transportation. Circular migrants, who despite 
these factors concentrate their activities in the Black Sea region, are to a large 
extent, more economically disadvantaged than the traders frequenting Laleli. 
To sum up, as an informal economic activity transnational petty trade 
provides a living for migrants from CEE countries and it supports the informal 
economy in Turkey, particularly garment, leather and footwear manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade, hotels, restaurants and transportation sectors. 
Migrant petty traders’ economic involvement in Turkey is largely confined 
to their role as purchasers of goods, which means that they do not seek 
employment in the Turkish labour market. The lack of extensive regulation in the 
suitcase trade is tolerated by the authorities due to the significant magnitude 
of export revenue and local employment that it generates. The practice of 
declaring goods as “passenger luggage”, whereas they are in fact transported 
on separate cargo planes is indicative of the extent of official support for the 
“suitcase business”. In this context, the “autonomy of migration” refers to the 
room for manoeuvring that migrants have in order to devise their own strategies 
of trading and border crossing.
5 .2 . the Sex induStry
Young women from Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine occupy a visible niche in the sex industry in Turkey (Erder and Kaska 
2003; Içduygu 2003). They enter the country on short-term tourist visas, and 
then overstay. Employment in the sex industry involves participation in a chain 
of informal business relations that include female recruiting agents in the home 
41 Own translation. Yükseker 2003, p.187.
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country, local pimps, drivers, hotel owners and so on. Not only is the market 
for sex work gendered, but racial stereotyping significantly affects earnings 
chances of migrant women engaged in prostitution. As Beller-Hann 1995 
observed in her field work in the Black Sea region, “the local population of the 
eastern coast of the Black Sea created its own moral geography of the former 
Soviet Union, and also a gendered race hierarchy”42. According to this “moral 
geography”, Russian women are constructed as white, “exotic, exciting, clean 
and refined, superior in beauty and culture” in contrast to Georgians, “who are 
stereotyped as dark and vulgar.”43 Although Georgian women still have access 
to sex work, their social and economic standing as sex workers substantially 
differs from that of Russian women. 
There is considerable debate about the extent of forced prostitution in 
Europe (Andrijasevic 2003). Yükseker 2003 guesses that some women earn 
the starting capital for suitcase trading through sex work. A study by Erder 
and Kaska 2003 also supports the view that  most migrant sex workers in 
Turkey consciously engage in prostitution for economic reasons. Upon arrival in 
Turkey however, they may encounter unexpectedly adverse working conditions 
resulting “... in being forced to work long hours, in passports being confiscated, 
lack of freedom of movement and wages that are either reduced or withheld 
altogether.” (71) Exploited sex workers often do not contact the authorities for 
fear that they may be deported and that restrictions may be imposed on their 
freedom to travel (62). In 2002, Turkey adopted specific legislation to combat 
trafficking in women and forced prostitution more effectively (27). In May 2005 
the International Migration Organisation (IOM) and the Turkish government 
launched a major campaign to help victims of trafficking through the distribution 
of informational leaflets at key border crossings, the introduction of a helpline 
and the provision of “training for law enforcement and medical, psychological 
and direct assistance to trafficked individuals.”44 Since then, reports on the 
plight of forced prostitutes and on rescue operations have started to appear 
frequently in the media 45.
However, foreign nationals engaged in prostitution remain subject to 
deportation – although not on the grounds of prostitution as such (which 
is legal in licensed brothels), but for lack of a valid residence and/or work 
permit (47). In 2001, over 30 per cent of deportations of Eastern European 
citizens (particularly Romanian, Moldavian and Georgian women) were due to 
participation in prostitution and/or testing positive for sexually transmitted 
diseases46. In recent years, some migrant sex workers entered marriages 
of convenience to attain Turkish citizenship and thus avoid deportation. In 
response, Turkish citizenship laws were changed in June 2003, introducing 
42  Beller-Hann (1995), p. 222.
43  Beller-Hann (1995), p. 222.
44 http://iom.int/en/news/pbn310505.shtml
45 For instance, see several news stories in Radikal in March 2006
46 Erder/Kaska (2003), Tables 9-11, p.19-21
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a three year residential qualifying period47. According to the Ministry of the 
Interior, marriages between citizens from CEE countries and Turkey declined 
dramatically after the legislative change was introduced. Within a year, the 
number of marriages between Azerbaijani and Turkish citizens declined from 
919 to 22. For Romanians and Moldavians a similar decline could be observed: 
from 434 to 32 and from 902 to 14 respectively48.
In more conservative parts of Turkey, such as the Black Sea region, the 
appearance of Georgian and Russian migrant sex workers has seriously 
challenged the moral fabric of society - while economically boosting the 
hotel, restaurant and entertainment industries. Local women particularly 
feel victimised by their husbands’ attraction to women who are regarded as 
“different” (Beller-Hann 1995: 219). Secondly, the substantial sums of money 
men spend on entertainment by sex workers constitute a strain on families’ 
economic resources. From the local women’s perspective, the appearance of 
sex workers has led to a redistribution of family income towards their husbands’ 
recreational desires, and thus to the migrant women. The economic dependency 
of women (many of whom do not engage in paid work or do not control the 
money they earn) exacerbates the economic urgency of the situation. 
With time, local women have developed a variety of discursive and practical 
resistance strategies, which in turn affects the viability of sex work as an 
economic option for migrant women. Some local women have opened their 
own bank accounts to control family finances, while others have entered paid 
work to gain a degree of economic independence. Women have also pressurized 
kin to enforce family values with the aim of preventing their husbands from 
spending kin controlled economic resources such as inheritance on migrant 
prostitutes49. Middle class townswomen and the religious right, on the other 
hand, have concentrated on political campaigning against the presence of 
migrant sex workers in the region. Their sustained public interventions have led 
to increased stigmatization and sexual harassment of migrant women from CIS 
countries, irrespective of whether they engage in sex work. Their campaigns 
have strengthened the unitary “Muslim-Turkish identity in an ethnically diverse 
region” of Turkey (Beller-Hann 1995: 230) and have caused a backlash 
in terms of women’s rights. A more restrictive female subjectivity has been 
socially reinforced to the extent that, in order to avoid harassment, many 
women choose to visibly differentiate themselves from migrants by wearing 
a headscarf (Hann and Beller-Hann 1998). Some migrant “suitcase traders” 
have followed suit, securing police protection against sexual harassment by 
converting to Islam50. 
In Kars in the eastern province of Turkey, local authorities externalized 
the issue through a decision to relocate migrant sex workers’ spaces to the 
periphery of the city:
47 European Commission 2003: Chapter 24.
48 Hürriyet, July 20th, 2005.
49 Beller-Hann (1995), p.229.
50 Yukseker (2003), p.190.
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“... We decided to close down all alcohol serving restaurants frequented by 
Natashas. The permits [of the restaurants] had been issued by the governor. 
We will not renew their permits in the city centre. Space has been provided 
for entertainment centres to relocate outside of the city because they do not 
follow hygienic regulations, because they bring about a decline in morals.”51
Interestingly enough, the voices of local sex workers, who must have suffered 
economic disadvantage through competition from migrant women engaged in 
prostitution, have not been heard in this debate.
5 .3 . domeStic work
A morally less contested sector of migrant employment is domestic work. In 
Turkey, migrant live-in domestic workers are primarily women from the Turkish 
speaking Gagauz ethnic group in Southern Moldova (Keough 2003). Lesser 
networks of migrant domestic workers are also reported for women from the 
Philippines, Iraq, Morocco and Ethiopia (Danıs¸ 2005; Perouse 2004:22). 
Migrant domestic workers have been working in this market niche since 
the mid-1990s, meeting the demand of middle and upper class families for 
affordable and reliable live-in domestic workers. According to one estimate, 
their earnings are 50-60 per cent less than their Turkish counterparts (Lordog˘lu 
2005: 119). Until recently, migrant domestic workers used to enter the country 
on tourist visas and slip into illegality by overstaying. Part of their wages then 
went towards smuggler fees, bribes and fines for visa overstaying (Keough 
2003:75). In 2003, legislation was adapted to allow for work permits to be 
issued to migrants for domestic work. It remains to be seen to what extent 
employers take advantage of this opportunity to legalize their employment 
relation, which  inevitably would bring the obligations of a formal work contract 
with it (European Commission 2003:Chapter 24). 
As Keough (2003) shows, the market for domestic work is not only gendered 
but also ethnically segmented:
“The high demand for Moldovan women in particular relies upon their 
reputations as upright people and good caretakers, “cleaner”, “more literate”, 
and “more civilised” than their Turkish villager counterparts who usually fill 
such roles. This perception indexes a belief in the higher class and culture of a 
population perceived as more “European” than the Turkish one.” (74)
Gagauz domestic workers maintain informal networks of job opportunities 
based on these positive ethnicised representations (Keough 2003: 75). 
Employers rely on these images and the recommendations they get from the 
Gagauz domestics, who can in this way organize a job for their acquaintances. 
Church communities in Istanbul in turn, often act as informal intermediaries for 
young Iraqi Chaldean women to work as live-in domestic workers, babysitters and 
cleaners in non-Muslim families. Finally, domestic workers from the Philippines 
rely on placement agencies who advertise in local Turkish newspapers. Their 
51 Own translation. Radikal, March 3, 2006.
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English language skills, work experience and the formal referral through an 
agency may earn them up to four times as much as domestics from CEE 
countries (Lordog˘lu 2005: 116-121).
The image of the “foreign” domestic worker is overlaid with the gendered 
image of the single woman in need of protection in a foreign country. Some 
Turkish employers may thus regard themselves as entitled to scrutinize the 
social lives of their employees in the name of female propriety (75). Migrant 
domestic workers are also often conflated with sex workers from CEE countries 
and subjected to sexual harassment. However,
“[t]hrough their own practices, Gagauz women resist these reputations, 
but they also seek to manipulate them, and thus often accommodate and 
confirm the constructions of migrant women workers – and Russian woman 
– as sexually promiscuous or as vulnerable women in need of protection. … 
A flirtation may help lower the cost for a sweater for her husband, or secure a 
letter home, or make a local ally to rely on in the frequent police raids.” (75)
5 .4 . other employment opportunitieS
So far, there is only scant information available on undocumented migrants’ 
economic activities in other sectors. For instance, the Ministry of Tourism issues 
work permits for migrant performing artists (estimated at 10,000), the majority 
of whom comes from Eastern Europe. The legal employment status reduces 
their risk of exploitation, but the inadequate implementation of labour law 
undermines the formality of the employment relation, with the consequence 
that migrant workers may still receive only part of their wages.52   
Particularly large research gaps remain on the economic activities of male 
migrants from CEE countries, as well as migrants and refugees from Asia and 
Africa. Given the long time periods transit migrants spend in Turkey under 
precarious conditions, research in this  area becomes all the more important 53. 
It is also known that many asylum seekers are pushed into informal economic 
activity for lack of financial resources:
“In theory, asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to work and receive 
social assistance in Turkey. However, in practice, acquiring a work permit is next 
to impossible. This often forces people to engage in illegal activity, which in 
turn makes them vulnerable to deportation for violation of Turkish law.”54
From the scant data available on undocumented migrants’ labour market 
participation we know that migrant workers from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, 
Georgia, Romania, Afghanistan and Iraq work in the construction industry. Other 
industries that employ migrant workers include textiles, leather goods, haulage 
and handling, small-scale chemical industries, restoration, woodworking, 
52 Erder and Kaska (2003), p.52.
53 An IOM study estimates that on average transit migrants spend three years in Turkey (cited in 
Içduygu 2003, p.25-26). The duration of stay may increase further as a consequence of more 
rigorous border enforcement.
54 Kiris¸çi (2003), p.67
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recycling, restaurants and retail trade (Lordog˘lu 2005:114; Perouse 2004:22; 
Içduygu2003: 28; Erder/Kaska 2003: 38). Iraqi Christian women are reported 
to work in garment sweatshops and housecleaning in Istanbul (Danıs¸ 2005:27). 
Migrant women from Moldova, Lithuania and Ukraine interviewed for a major 
Turkish newspaper said they worked in garment workshops in central Istanbul. 
They reportedly had married, acquired Turkish citizenship and settled down 
in Turkey, even sending for their children to join them55. There have also 
been media reports of smugglers arranging seasonal work for undocumented 
migrants in coastal cities such as Adana, Antalya, Izmir and Bodrum56. The 
study of Yaghmaian 2005 on transit migrants variously mentions work in a 
candle making factory, in a bag-making sweatshop, as cook for an office in a 
business district, as bouncer in a bar, as private tutor, as street vendor and as 
computer expert and translator in an international clothing factory. But overall, 
poverty and unemployment dominate his account on the economic situation 
of migrants in Turkey (11-107).  
Migrants have further been reported to be working in agriculture in the 
Black Sea region and Western Anatolia (Içduygu 2003: 17; Lordog˘lu 2005: 
114). This means that they compete with Kurdish seasonal workers who travel 
the country following the harvest calendar of crops. According to one account, 
seasonal labourers start off in Urfa in South-eastern Anatolia in the spring, then 
work in the sugar beet, lentil and chick pea harvests in Central Anatolia, in the 
nut harvest in the Black Sea region and finally in the grape and cotton harvests 
in the western regions57. 
The unevenness in the production of knowledge on the economic practices 
of different migrant groups may reflect differences in economic visibility or bias 
in research interests. Certainly, it points to difficulties in conducting empirical 
research in this area. It can also be taken as indicative of the difficulties migrants 
encounter in accessing employment, despite the informality of employment 
structures. Given the widespread nature of informal employment relations in 
Turkey and low institutional barriers to entry (in the sense that no work permit 
is required), one might expect undocumented migrants to easily gain access 
to informal employment. But an important factor that hinders migrants from 
finding jobs on the informal labour market is the high level of unemployment in 
Turkey. The official unemployment rate stood at 10.5 per cent in 2003. But the 
employment rate of merely 43.2 per cent, in combination with a poverty rate of 
27 per cent suggest that competition among the non-employed is substantially 
higher than the unemployment rate implies58. Therefore, the situation of 
undocumented migrants on the Turkish labour market differs from that in other 
Southern European countries, where a high level of unemployment coexists 
with a high demand for migrants’ cheap labour in sectors such as agriculture, 
55 Hürriyet, 3. January 2005.
56 Postexpress, August 2001.
57 Postexpress, October 2004.
58 OECD 2004, p. 46, Table 1.2 and p.60, Table 2.4. The poverty rate refers to the year 2002, the 
employment rate has been calculated on the basis of data for 2003.
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construction, hotels/catering and domestic work (Baldwin-Edwards 2002). 
Consequently, there is no evidence that the populist statement made by the 
Minister of Labour and Social Solidarity Yas¸ar Okuyan in 2001 that “There are 
more than one million illegal workers in Turkey. Every day, one million loaves 
of bread are being stolen from my people”59 bears any relation to the actual 
significance of migrant employment in Turkey (Içduygu 2004:7). 
On the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that the demand for migrant 
labour remains quite limited. There is no evidence that pressure from Turkish 
authorities prevents the employment of migrant workers in the informal 
economy. In this sense, we can speak of a “laissez faire” policy. However, 
empirical research on the informal economy in Turkey underlines the importance 
of kinship, ethnic and diasporic networks in accessing employment. Migrants 
from rural areas often rely on other persons originating from the same village 
or town (“hems¸eri”) to find a job in the city and that these extended kinship 
networks control particular lines of occupation (Peker 1996). Lacking such 
networks puts migrants at a serious economic disadvantage. The pressure 
they exert on the labour supply is not decisive in generating employment 
opportunities for them. Rather, it appears that their chances on the labour 
market are largely confined to those niches in which they have succeeded in 
creating their own ethnically defined networks.
Migrants are particularly vulnerable to “decent work deficits” in the 
informal economy: They have to rely on informal contracts that they cannot 
enforce legally or through social networks; they have no social or economic 
security; they lack opportunities for skill development and protection against 
occupational injuries; they have little or no access to benefits (International 
Labour Conference 2002:3-4). Fear of arrest socially isolates and economically 
marginalizes many undocumented migrants (Danıs¸ 2005; Içduygu 2003). The 
labour market discrimination experienced even by migrants with access to 
citizenship rights and social networks, such as Bulgarians and internally displaced 
Kurds, point to a wider prevalence of ethnic discrimination in the labour market 
(Kümbetog˘lu 2003; Vasileva 2005: 349; Erdem/Özevin/Özselçuk 2003). African 
transit migrants in particular, are known to face serious problems of racism, 
poverty and the lack of opportunities for social integration. They appear to 
have the poorest chances of accessing employment (Yaghmaian 2003; Çalkıvık 
2003; Içduygu 2003). Onbas¸ı(2004) found that African migrants (particularly 
Senegalese) try to make a living as street vendors, porters and construction 
workers. Media reports of migrants from Nigeria, Indonesia, Iran, Somali and 
Bulgaria arrested on charges of begging provide a glimpse of the dire economic 
situation faced by some migrants60. Many have to rely on aid from NGOs or 
church affiliated local charities such as the catholic Caritas-Turkey and the 
Istanbul Inter-Parish Migrants Programme.  Police harassment, maltreatment 
59 Postexpress, August 2001.
60 Radikal, 23 October 2004.
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and detention are reported to be widespread61 and media discourse often 
reinforces popular racist sentiments (Bora 2003; Çalkıvık 2003).   
Savings and financial support from relatives in countries of origin or the 
West and from NGOs become crucial sources of income when opportunities 
for paid employment are rare (Içduygu 2003). To the extent possible, migrants 
mobilize transnational kinship and religious networks for legal and financial 
assistance, jobs and social integration. Relatives who are already settled in 
Western countries financially assist family members during their stay in Turkey 
and sponsor their settlement overseas. Relatives who reside in Turkey support 
newcomers’ adaptation to everyday life. Finally, church based networks 
provide opportunities for “social interaction, information sharing on housing 
or job opportunities, education facilities for children, provision of food, 
clothing or medical assistance...” (Danıs¸ 2005:8) Church officials and church 
affiliated organisations such as Caritas also act as intermediaries between the 
undocumented migrants and Turkish authorities. However, the fact that Turkey 
legally only recognizes Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews as non-
Muslim religious communities sets clear limits to the institutional development 
of church based community services for migrant groups such as Iraqi Chaldean 
Christians (18). Moreover, these networks insert migrants within “hierarchies of 
power and community control mechanisms and [create] an order of discipline 
and punishment in the transit period.” (10). Such morally coded restrictions 
also hold for the Armenian community in Turkey, which means that Armenian 
sex workers would not be allowed to access ethnic community networks of 
solidarity (Erder/Kaska 2003:57). 
6 . concluSionS
This paper has deployed the concept of the “autonomy of migration”, i.e. 
self-organized transnational mobility to discuss contemporary migration flows 
from the “Global South” to and transit migration through Turkey. Empirical 
findings suggest that migrants show substantial agency and innovation in 
crossing borders and in tapping in to the informal economy in order to secure 
their livelihoods. Women from Eastern European countries in particular, have 
succeeded in claiming distinct, if still precarious, social and economic spaces in 
occupational niches such as cross-border trade, sex work and domestic work. 
They may position themselves in one or more of these spaces over time, as 
exemplified by the case of migrant domestic workers in Istanbul:
“The Gagauz domestics acted as intimate companions to their charges, 
hard-working wage-earners, good wives and mothers, but also at times as 
merchants, and at times they had sex with men in exchange for affection, 
61 The most systematic attempt to deport African migrants from Turkey took place in July 2001, 
when over 100 africans living in Istambul were arrested -irrespective of their residence status- and 
deported to the Greek border. For days, both countries refused entry to the migrants and provided 
no food or humanitarian aid, resulting in the death of four migrants, several incidences of rape and 
at least one miscarriage. (Yaghmaian 2003:147) 
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favors, or money. Some of these women may participate in more than one 
type of work, others may not. Some consider all of these things work, others 
don’t.”62  
Yet, migrant agency should not be taken to imply a status of either equality 
or independence. Undocumented migrants suffer a variety of “decent work 
deficits” that derive from being forced to rely on informal economy structures. 
Moreover, migrant women outside of the CEE region and male migrants in 
general appear to face high barriers to enter informal employment relations. 
The high level of domestic unemployment, network hiring practices, the 
language barrier and xenophobia, accompanied by a discourse of “foreigners 
taking away jobs” constitute a drawback for these migrants, even though a work 
permit is not required. Further research is certainly needed to systematically 
identify the discriminatory mechanisms that uniquely disadvantage migrants 
vis-à-vis local job seekers. 
The extent to which the government’s recent policy initiative to curb 
unregistered employment will affect migrant workers’ labour market chances 
also remains to be seen. In February 2005, the Ministry for Labour and 
Social Security started a campaign that aims to promote formal employment 
relations. The campaign spelled out the specific target of identifying 100,000 
migrants working undocumented in Turkey and to replace them through 
Turkish workers in a registered work relation. Sanctions towards companies 
employing undocumented migrants include exclusion from public tenders. For 
more effective enforcement, a helpline to report undocumented workers will 
be introduced63. The manner in which a campaign for workers’ rights can so 
easily be centred on an anti-immigrant policy stance is deeply troubling.  
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